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lfp/ss lee 3/10/72 
No. 71-11 JAMES v. STRANGE 
Preliminary Memorandum 
for File 
I have read the briefs in the above case, and will need no bench 
memorandum. 
The facts are simple: Kansas has a statute, called "Aid to 
Indigent Defendants Act", which provides - in relevant part - that where 
the state furnishes counsel to an indigent defendant: 
". . . the defendant shall be liable to the State of Kansas 
for a sum equal to such expenditure (the cost of providing 
counsel), and such sum shall be recovered, if necessary, 
by entering the amount of the expenditure ... as a 
judgment agai11st the defendant. " 
Question: 
Whether the above statute is an unconstitutional condition or restraint 
on the right of an indigent to be provided free counsel by the state. 
A three judge court (Appendix to Jurisdictional Statement) held the 
statute unconstitutional, saying: 
"It is apparent that the statute needlessly encourages indigents 
to do without counsel and consequently infringes on the right to 
counsel as explicated in Gideon v. Wainwright." 
The Attorney General of Kansas has filed a rather inept brief, 
supporting the constitutionality on the ground that a state has the right 
to recoup from an indigent defendant if and when such defendant becomes 
2. 
able to reimburse the state for the free legal services. 
The brief notes (p. 10) that a number of states have "reimbursement 
provisions" generally similar to the Kansas law (p. 10 of Appellant's brief), 
including Virginia. 
The brief also refers to 18 U. S. C. 3006A(f) - as being a federal 
reimbursement provision. 
The Kansas brief also quotes Mr. Justice stewart in Rinaldi v. Yeager, 
384 U.S. 305 (1966) as follows: 
"We may assume the state can validly provide for the 
recoupment of the cost of appeals from those who later 
become financially able to pay. " 
Jtvv. ~'N(~t- . 11-/tr-) 
s·~~~~~~ 
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lfp/ss lee 3/23/72 
No. 71-11 JAMES v. STRANGE 
Argued 3/22/72 
Tentative Impressions* 
This case involves the validity of the Kansas statute which allows 
the state to take a judgment against an indigent to recover counsel fees. 
three-judge district court 
The · · held the statute unconstitutional -
as infringing the right to counsel, citing Gideon. 
Yet, it was conceded in argument that there is nothing in the 
record to support the view that the statute "chills" or deters indigents 
from exercising their right to counsel. 
My Tentative Conclusion: 
I would reverse the three-judge district court, as I do not think 
this statute violates a constitutional right. 
The statute may be bad legislation and bad policy, but the ___....... 
solution is legislative action - not requiring a decision of constitutional 
dimensions by this Court. 
* * * * * 
*These impressions are dictated on the afternoon following argument 
to record my initial and tentative impressions. I will have read, 
in preparation for the arguments, the principal briefs, some of the 
cases and the bench memo. I hope to do further study before the 
Conference. My views are subject to change and to the discussion 
at the Conference. 
2. 
Near the end of the argument, a question was raised as to 
whether the respondent received adequate notice. See p. 3 of Green 
Brief (appellee's motion to dismiss). Justice stewart suggested that 
we might remand on this notice issue. 
Justice Powell: 
I thought I should write you a brief prefatory note on 
James v. Strange. 
This is obviously a very bad statute, but the question is 
finding a tenable constitutional reason for striking it. The 
search for a constitutional ratio~le is made more difficult by 
the fact that many states have recoupment laws of many differ-
ent sorts, and I wanted to be certain that the opinion was ~xit 
written in such a way as to excise the cancerous parts of this 
Kansa~ statute ~i~ without seeming to jeopardize the general 
principle of recoupment. ix~E~exix~a~exs~EEeee~e~ ThAt of 
course makes everything we say very sensitive. 
For these and ~E~ other reasons I have tried to keep this 
a crisp, short e~i~e opinion ~~ without, however, ieax omitting -
features important to our analysis. 
As the opinion represents in large part my own research 
without help from the briefs or the opinion of the court below 
I want to recheck it for accuracy yet another time, though I 
have already made every effort to ma have my statements correct. 
There are three possible ways to approach this case. 
The first is through the E~ rationale of the Sixth Amend-
ment and the right to counsel. The lower court took this route. 
This did not seem to accord with the wishes of the conference 
which wanted a narrow ~ opinion. I am convinced there is no 
way to draft this opinion on a rigtht to EB~s counsel basis 
~i~t without seeming to jeopardixe every state recoupment law of 
this type. Once we get into the business of a saying a particular 
staute chills the right to counsel, there will be no end to the 
chilling 9 no rational way to se~axate save these statutes. Also, 
I keep ~ thinking that everybody's right to counsel i~ is 
~~iiii chilled in the sense t~t that t~¥e they know if they 
~ave hire counsel, they know they have to pay for it. 
There is also the due process ground which I think is 
inapplicable. If we get to the point of requiring notice of 
the debt for all these recoupment statutes to be valid, then 
we would be striking every recoupment sta~ statute in the country 
si~~ since very few provide for notice to the defendant of his 
debt before ~~~x counsel is appointed him. 
Also, once we get to the point of requiring notice, then we 
are slowly falling into what I think would be the liberAL's 
desires to have all of these statutes invalidated under the 
right to counsel t~ese thesis. If you have to notify a guy zi~~t 
of the debt right before you assign him counsel, then it obviously 
is going to ~~iii "chill" him ai little bit, and all these 
e recoupment statutes are in trouble. 
Try and read the whole thing before ti~Kexi~~xwi~txwit~x 
you do anything with it. I think the e~~z opinion holds together 
pretty well m¥ but this is ax~m~ conceptually a tough nut. 
JHW 
DouGLAS, J. ~ MARSHALL, J. 
STEWART, J. POWELL, J. a _J_/ ~ ( ~ 
/f L-v-t- ' ~ 0-..,1 
./ 
WHITE, J. REHNQUIST, J. ;&. 
(~. ~~L;.~~~ 


















































































































































































































jhw/ss tee 5/20/72 
No. 71-11 JAMES v. STRANGE 
~~..e-
'Fhe-ease-bsim-e-us presents a constitutional challenge to 
. "\ 
a Kansas recoupment statute, whereby the state may recover in 
subsequent civil proceedings counsel and other legal defense 
fees expended for the benefit of indigent defendants. The three-
judge court below held the statute unconstitutional~~.,{e<\... 
; ~ J-~ ~ ~ ~~v...t4~u ~ 
a.ad inwiR.ged upon the right to counsel established in Gideon v. 
1\ 
1 
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). _The state lla:s...appealed.~ 
o.--J_ ~ ~.J.. ~~"~i~ - I.A.. s.- ., ' 
. o-+-..t... ~ ~{-...!;L . 
The relevant facts[ma,- be-f>.F!.ef~summat:.i.zed. Appellee 
Str~e was arrested and charged with first degree robbery under 
Kansas law. He appeared before a magistrate, professed 
indigency, and accepted appointed counsel under the Kansas Aid 
2 
to Indigent Defendants Act. Appellee was then tried in the 
Shawnee County District Court on the reduced charge of pocket 
picking. He pled guilty and received a suspended sentence and 
three years probation. 
2. 
Thereafter, appellee's counsel applied to the state for 
payment for his services and received $500 from the Aid to Indigent 
Defendants Fund. Pursuant to Kansas' recoupment statute, the 
Kansas Judicial Administrator requested appellee to reimburse 
the state within sixty days or a judgment for the $500 would be 
docketed against him. Appellee contends this procedure violates 
his constitutional right to counsel. 
I 
It is necessary at the outset to explain the terms and 
3 
operation of the challenged statute. When the state provides 
indigent defendants with counsel or other legal services, the 
defendant becomes obligated to the state for the amount expended 
• in his behalf. Within 30 days of the expenditure, defendants 
14 
are notified of their debt and given 60 days to repay it. If 
the sum remains unpaid after the 60-day period, a judgment is 







annual interest runs on the debt from the date the expenditure 
was made. The debt becomes a lien on the real estate of 
defendant and may be executed by garnishment or in any other 
I 
manner provided by the Kansas code of civil procedTe. 
indigent defendant is not, however, accorded any of 1he 
I 
The 
exemptions provided by that code for other judgment debtors 
3. 
except the homestead exemption. If the judgment is not executed 
within five years, it bee omes dormant, ceases to operate as 
a lien on the debtor's real estate, but may be revived in the 
same manner as other dormant judgments under the code of 
5 
civil procedure. 
Several features of this procedure merit mention. The 
entire program is administered by the judicial administrator, a 
public official, but appointed counsel are private practitioners. 
The statute nowhere defines the circumstances under which the 
state would seek reimbursement. Recovered sums do, however, 







The Kansas statute is but one of many state recoupment 
laws applicable to counsel fees and expenditures paid for indigent 
6 
defendants.. The statutes vary widely in their terms. Under 
some statutes, the indigent's 
liability is to the county in which he is tried; in others to the state. 
Alabama and Indiana make assessment and recovery of an 
indigent's counsel fees discretionary with the court. Florida's 
recoupment law has no statute of limitations and the state is 
deemed to have a perpetual lien against the defendant's real 
'1 e .Jdaho, on the other hand, 
and personal property and estate. /f 
has a five-year state of limitations on the recovery of an 
"indigent's" concealed assets at the time of trial and a three 
year statute for the recovery of later acquired ones. In Virginia 
. and West Virginia, the amount paid to court appointed counsel 
is assessed only against ~.Qaf,i9.!;,1t1defendants as part of costs, 
while Oregon's recoupment statute expressly applies "whether 













The same Oregon statute assesses costs against defendant on 
a formula prescribed by the Public Defender Committee while 
North Dakota sets counsel fees "at a reasonable rate to be 
determined by the court. " It is thus readily apparent that state 
~~~~~ 
reimbursement laws aud proc!'ctures).""ry l>•""i!HY in\their 
o8 1 
particulars. Given the wide a.a8 sM-estttftti:s.l differences in the 
features of these statutes, any broadside pronouncement on 
their general validity Eli would be inappropriate. 
~ 
We turn~ to the Kansas statute, aware that our reviewing 
function is a limited one. We do not inquire whether this statute 
is wise, or desirable, or "whether it is based on assumptions 
scientifically substantiated. " Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 
476, 501 (1957) (Harlan J., concurring). Misguided laws may 
nonetheless be constitutional. It has been noted both in the 
. . 
briefs and at argument that only $17, 000 has been recovered under 





















amount is negligible compared to the total expended. Our task, 
however, is not to weigh this statute's effectiveness but its 
constitutionality Whether the returns under the statute justify 
the expense, ::tk:R time, and efforts of state officials is for the 
ongoing supervision o!' the legislative branch. 
The court below invalidated this statute on the grounds 
that "it needlessly encourages indigents to do without counsel 
and consequently infringes on the right to counsel as explicated 
in Gideon v. Wainwright, supra. " 322 F. Supp. at .In 
Gideon, counsel had been denied an indigent defendant charged 
with a felony because his was not a capital case. The Court k."!X 
often has voided state statutes and practices which denied to 
accused indigents the means to present effective defenses in 
courts of law. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); 
D_!'~per v Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Lane v. Brown, 




Here, however, Kansas has enacted laws both to provide and 
10 
compensate from public funds counsel for the indigent. There 
is certainly no denial of the right to counsel in the strictest sense. 
Whether the statutory obligations for repayment impermissibly 
deter the exercise of this right is a question we need \not reach, 
I 
for we find the statute before us constitutionally infirm on other 
grounds. 
II 
The state has asserted in argument before this court 
that the statute ''has attempted to treat them [indigent defendants] 
the same as would any civil judgment debtor be treated in the 
11 
state courts, . . " Again, in its brief the state asserts 
that "for all practical purposes the methods available for 
enforcement of the judgment are the same as those provided 
12 
by the Code of Civil Procedure or any other civil judgment. " 
The challenged portion of the statute thrice alludes to means of 












- Yet the ostensibly equal treatment of indigent defendants 
·~ 
with other civil judgment debtors recedes as one examines the 
~ 
statute more closely. The statute ::r&timx stipulates that save for 
the homestead, "none of the exemptions provided for in the code 
of civil procedure shall apply to any such judgment . II 
This provision strips from indigent defendants the array of 
protective exemptions Kansas has erected for other civil 
judgme:d debtors, including restrictions on the amount of 
disposable earnings subject to garnishment, protection of the 
debtor from wage garnishment at times of severe personal or 
family sickness, and exemption from attachment and execution 
on a debtor's personal clothing, books and tools of trade. 
~ 
~~. ~ 




food, fuel and clothing, 
means of transportation, ~n pension funds, and even a 









Of the above exemptions, none is more important to a 
debtor than his protection from unrestricted wage garnishment. 
The debtor's wages are his sustenance, with which he supports 
himself and his family. The average low income war earner 
must spend nearly nine-tenths of those wages for items of 
I 
16 I 
immediate consumption. This Court has recognized the 
potential of certain garnishment proceedings to "impose 
tremendous hardships on wage earners with families to support. " 
17 
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 39 :., U.S. 337, 340 (1969). 
Kansas has likewise perceived the burden to a debtor and his 
. family when wages may be subject to wholesale garnishment. 
Consequently, under its code of civil procedure, the maximum 
. which can be garnisheed is the lesser of 25% of a debtor's 
weekly disposable earnings or the amount by which those 
earnings exceed thirty times the federal minimum hourly wage . 
· No one credit may issue more than one garnishment during 
10. 
any one month, and no employer may discharge an employee 
because his earnings have been garnisheed for a single 
18 
indebtedness. To deny these protections to the once criminally 
accused is to risk denying him the very means needed to keep 
himself and his family afloat. 
The indigent's predicament under this statute comes 
more into focus when compared with that of one who has hired 
. counsel in his defense. Should the latter prove unable to pay 
and a judgment be obtained against him, his obligation would 
become enforceable under the relevant provisions of the Kansas 
code of civil procedure. But, unlike the indigent under the 
recoupment statute, the code's exemptions would protect this 
judgment ·debtor. 
As a further matter, the imposition under the statute 
of six percent annual interest applies to the debts of indigent 












under the Kansas code of civil procedure. The interest build-up 
under this statute, moreover, is not insubstantial. In the five 
years before the judgment bee omes dormant, interest accumulations 
could lift appellee's $500 debt to $669. If the dormant judgment 
is revived within the statutorily prescribed two yearl the principal 
I 
19 
and interest might total over $750. 00. 
I 
X> It may be argued that an indigent accused, from whom 
the state has provided counsel, is in a different class with respect 
to collection of his indebtedness than a judgment creditor whose 
obligation arose from a private transaction. But other Kansas 
statutes providing for recoupment of public assistance to 
indigents do not feature the severe provisions imposed on indigent 
defendants in this case. Kansas, has enacted, as have many 
other st: laws for state recovery of public welfare assistance. 
Yet the I .as welfare recipient, unlike the indigent defendant, 
does not face denial of exemptions or forced accumulation of 
20 
interest on his public debt. 
We recognize, of course, that the state's claim to 
reimburse may take precedence, under appropriate circumstances, 
over the claims of private creditors and that enforcement 
21 
procedures with respect to judgments need not be identical. 
This does not mean, however, that a state may impose unduly 
harsh or discriminatory ter ms merely because the obligation 
is to the public treasury rather than to a private creditor. The 
state itself in the statute before us analogizes the judgment lien 
against the indigent defendant to other "judgments under the 
code of civil procedure. " But the statute then strips the indigent 
defendant of the very exemptions designed primarily to benefit 
debtors of low and marginal incomes. 
The Kansas statute provides for recoupment whether 
the indigent defendant is acquitted or found guilty. If acquitted, 
the indigent finds himself obligated to Jm repay the state for 
a service the need for which was forced upon him by the state. 
·-
13. 
It is difficult to see why such a defendant, adjudged to be innocent 
of the state's charge, should be denied basic exemptions accorded 
all other judgment debtors. 'lJ1e indigent defendant who is found 
guilty is uniquely disadvantaged in terms of the practical operation 
of the statute. A· criminal conviction usually limits employment 
opportunities. This is especially true where a prison sentence 
has been served. It is in the interest of society and the state 
that such a defendant, upon satisfaction-of the criminal penalties 
imposed, be afforded a reasonable opportunity of employment, 
rehabilitation and return to useful citizenship. There is limited 
incentive to seek legitimate employment when, after serving 
a sentence during which interest has accumulated on the 
indebtedness for legal services, the indigent knows that his 
wages will be garnisheed without the benefit of any of the 
customary exemption. 
Appellee in this case has now married, works for a 
modest wage, and has recently become a father. To 
• 
14. 
deprive him of all protection of his wages and intimate 
personalty and simultaneously to compel the accumulation of 
interest on his debt discourages the very search for self-
sufficiency which might make of the criminally accused a 
contributing citizen. Not only does this treatment not accord 
with the treatment of indigent recipients of public welfare or 
' 
with that of other ciyil judgme~t debtors to whom the Kansas 
22 
statute makes reference. The Kansas statute is alone among 
· this nation's recoupment laws in RXJ:QX~ expressly stripping 
a defendant-debtor of basic exemptions and in compelling the 
23 
accumulation of interest on his obligation. 
III 
Rinaldi v. Yaeger, 384 U.S. 305 (1966) confronted this 
Court with a situation comparable in some respects to the case 
at hand. Rinaldi involved a New Jersey statute which required 
only those indigent defendants who were sentenced to confinement 
in state institutions to reimburse the state the costs of a transcript 
15. 
on appeal. In Rinaldi, as here, a broad ground of decision was 
urged, namely the voidance of this statute as discouraging an 
indigent's freedom to appeal. The Court, however, found a 
different basis for decision - that "to fasten a financial burden 
only upon those unsuccessful ~appellants who are confined in state 
institutions . . . is to make an invidious discrimination "in 
violation of the equal protection clause. Id. at 309. 
Rinaldi affirmed that the equal protection clause "imposes 
a requirement of some rationality in the nat'!lre of the class 
:s~ singled out. " Id. at 308-9. This requirement is lacking 
where, as in the instant case, the state has subjected indigent 
defendants to uniquely harsh conditions of repayment. This 
case, to be sure, differs from Rinaldi in that Mm: here all 
indigent defendants are treated alike. But to impose these 
conditions solely on a class of debtors who were provided 







than in Rinaldi, a discrimination which the equal protection clause 
proscribes. 
In Rinaldi, the Court assumed arguendo "that a legis-
lature could validly provide for replenishing a county treasury 
. . . \ 
from the pockets of those who have directly benefitted from 
. I . 
I 
county expenditures. " Id. at 309. We note here also that 
the state interests represented by recoupment laws may prove 
important ones. Recoupment proceedings may protect the state 
from fraudulent concealment of assets and assertions of indigency. 
Many states, moreover, face expanding criminal dockets, and 
this Court has required appointed counsel for indigents in 
24 25 
widening classes of cases and stages of prosecution. 
Such trends have heightened the burden on public revenues, and 
recoupment laws reflect legislative efforts to recover some of 
the added costs. Finally, federal dominance of the nation's 
major revenue sources has encouraged state and local govern-
ments to attempt new methods of conserving public funds, 
17. 
not only through the recoupment of indigents' counsel fees 
but of other forms of public assistance as· well. 
We thus recognize that state recoupment statutes may 
betoken legitimate state interests. But these interests are not 
thwarted by requiring more even treatment of indigent criminal 
defendants with other classes of debtors to whom the statute 
itself repeatedly makes reference. state recoupment laws, 
notwithstanding the state interests they serve, need not blight 
in such discriminatory fashion the hopes of indigents for self 
sufficiency and self respect. For the state to profess fair 
treatment of defendant-debtors while fastening upon them 
4 
I 
unique impediments has precisely this effect. The statute 
before us bears earmarks of punitiveness and discrimination 
l 
I 
. which violate the rights of citizens to equal treatment under the law. 









1. The opinion of the three-judge court is reported in 
323 F. Supp. 1230 (D. Kan. 1971). 
I 
I 
2. K. S. A. 1971 Supp. 22-4501 to 22-4515. 
3. K. S. A. 1971 Supp. 22-4513. The statute reads as follows: 
3 
STATUTE INVOLVED 
gN·~·:1J:7fn4PPr~ ~~1~~,g~f}ti JffiJ~tY/j~:/ ~) 
~~g~ktiG.e·afu1ftlot-eEt.ilitt~~f6w~_;;.-, 
" (a) Whenew~r any expenditure has been made from 
the aid to indigent defendants fund to provide coun-
sel and other defense services to any defendant, as 
authorized by section 10 [62-3110], such defendant 
shall be liable to the state of Kansas for a sum equal 
to such expenditure, and such sum may be recovered 
from the defendant by the state of Kansas for the bene-
fit of the fund to aid indigent defendants. Within 
thirty (30) days after such expenditure, the judicial 
administrator shall send a notice by certified mail to 
the person on whose behalf such expenditure was 
made, which notice shall state the amount of the ex-
penditure and shall demand that the defendant pay 
said sum to the state of Kansas for the benefit of the 
fund to aid indigent defendants within sixty ( 60) days 
after receipt of such notice. The notice shall state that 
such sum became due on the date of the expenditure 
and the sum demanded will bear interest at six percent 
(6%) per annum from the due date until paid. Failure 
to receive any such notice shall not · relieve the person 
to whom it is addressed from the payment of the sum 
claimed and any interest due thereon. 
Should the sum demanded remain unpaid at the 
expiration of sixty (60) days after mailing the notice, 
the judicial administrator shall certify an abstract of 
the total amount of the unpaid demand and interest 
thereon to the clerk of the district court of the county 
in which counsel was appointed or the expenditure au-
thorized by the court, and such clerk shall enter the 
total amount thereof on his judgment docket and said 
total amount, together with the interest thereon at the 
:rate of six perc-ent (6 7(1 ) per <mnum. from the date of 
the expenditure thereof until paid, shall become a 
judgment in the same manner and to the same exlent 
as any other judgment under the code of civil pro-






4. Failure to receive notice, however, does not relieve 
the person to whom it is addressed of the obligation. 
5. A dorma~t judgment may be revived within two years 
of the date on which the judgment became dormant. K. S. A. 1971 
Supp. 60-2404. 
6. There is also a federal reimbursement provision, 
18 U. S. C. § 3006A(f): 
eft Receipt of other payments.-Whenever the United States magistrate 
or the court tlnds that tunds are available for payment from or on behalt 
of a person furnished representation, It may authorize or direct that such 
tunda be paid to the appointed attorney, to the bar association or legal 
a1d agency. or community defender organization which provided the ap. 
pointed attorney, to any person or organization authorized pursuant to 
IUbaeetlon (e) to render Investigative, expert, or other services, or to the 
eourt for deposit In the Treasury as a reimbursement to the approt>rla-
" Uon. current at the time ot payment, to carry out the provisions of this 
MCtion. Except as so authorized or directed, no such person or organiza-
tion may request or accept any payment or promue of payment for repre-
MD.tlnlr a defendant. 
7. The board of county commissioners has discretion 
to compromise or release the lien, however. Fla. State Ann. 
§ 27. 56 ( 1971 Supp. ). 
8. State recoupment statutes, including those quoted 





"Ala. Code, Title 17, § 318 (12) (1969 Supp. ); 
Alaska Stat. Ann. 1962 § 12. 55-020; Fla. stat. 
Ann. § 27. 56 (1971 Supp. ); Idaho Code Ann. 
§ 19-858 (1971 . Supp. ); Ind. Ann. state. 1956, 
9 -3 501 ( 19 71 Supp. ); Iowa Code Ann. § 77 5. 5 
(1971 Supp. ); Md. Code 1966, Art. 26 § 9; 
N. D. C. C. , § 29-07-01. 1; N. M. stat. Ann. , 
1953, § 41-22-7; Ohio R. C. § 2941-51 (1970' 
Supp. ); Ore. Rev. state. § 137. 205; S.C. Code 
1962, § 17-283 ( 1971 Supp. ); 2 Tex. C. C. P., 
Art. 26. 05 §§ 3, 5; Tex. C. C. P., Art. 1018; 
Va. Code Ann. § 14. 1-184 (1971 Supp. ); W. Va. 
Code Ann. (1955) § 6190; 29 Wis. state Ann. 
§256. 66. II 
9. For fiscal 1971 $400, 000 was appropriated to fund 
the program. 
10. See n. 2, supra. 
3. 
1/. W. Transcript of Oral Argument, p. 9. The state does 
admit that exemptions f~[c-fvil judgment debtors are broader 
iJ:m than for indigent defendants, a matter we will address 
forthwith. Id. p. 10. 
I~ Cl. Brief of Appellant, p. 7. 
11. ~ See K. S. A. 1971 Supp. 60-701 to 724, 60-2401 to 
2419. 
1 ~1!!$:. The exemptions are set forth inK. S. A. 1971 Supp. 
60-2301 to 60-2311. 





16. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Handbook at Labor 
Statistics 281 (1968). Low wage earners are defined as 
families with after-tax income of less than $5, 000. 
17. The Court in Sniadach held that Wisconsin's 
prejudgment wage garnishment procedure, as a taking of property 
wihtout notice and prior hearing, violated the due process clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
18. K. S. A. 1971 Supp. 60-2310(b) and 60-2311. Section 
60-2310 also provides further debtor protection from wage 
garnishment at a time of disabling personal sickness and from 
professional collecting agencies. See K. S. A. 1971 Supp. 
60-2310(c) and (d). See also Bennett, The 1970 Kansas Legislature 
in Review, 39 J. B. A. K. 107, 178, (1970~ which points out that 
the state's restrictions on garnishments has been made to 
conform to Title III of the federal Consumer Credit Protection 
Act, 82 Stat. 163. Kansas, however, had extensive restrictions 




statttt-o-ri:ly pre i:bed tw'O" y ears;-tlre-pTine ipl€-a-nd-inte.rest. ¥16'ttlEI--
...teta:l over =$1'50:-6<r.' 'The interest presumably would run while 
the judgment was dormant since :tk "a dormant judgment may be 
revived and have the same force and effect as if it had not become 
dormant ... " (emphasis supplied) K. S. A. 1971 Supp. 60-2404. 
b 
2c G) K. S. A. 1971 Supp. 39-7191; 59-2006. Section 
b 
39-7191 deals mainly with the recovery of assistance from an 
ineligible recipient. Yet even when the welfare recipient is 
deemed to have defrauded the state, he still escapes the interest 
accumulations and denied of exemptions imposed on indigent 
defendants: 3~JT 7 J!Jh. DutY of rc e i pic nrl \~£ r:~~~~:~~ 
cll'll1~"S' action hy hoar<\ rccov~ '! t i£ at 
an~c \~h'taincd hy inclii!,i.h c rceJ~1/t~s~istaucc 
. 1 .· " tlw coiJtlllllaliC<: · · · 1 ny liVH: < 111111,_, . ... : . , t thereof hecornes 
o any p('r~on, the J( .Upi<.D . ·n excess l 
Osscs<;cd of :llly property or lllt:o~nc 1 f , , nt· r · · · · 1 ttl t me o i!,r,t ' ,[the aiJIOIJJll asccrt:tlll<'< a JC II , f tbc 
ng assi~tancc:, it shall he the ~ IllY t. ,<;ial 
eci Jic·nt to notify tiJc: collnly hc~.ud o S( . ·s· 
vell·are inllrwcliatdy of the recc·lpl or posse 
• ___.-11 of such llrOlll:rly or income and said\ SJO f' · · · J couuly hoard 111ay, a tc ·r liJY< :s l.l).!,alHm, ~ance 
till~ as~i~tanC'e in accordance w1tlt tlte CJreum-
~taucc·s . . 1 b 
Any as~istancc: p:ucl ~hall IH' n·<·ovc ·rall e y 
till~ <.:<!llllt)' hoarc_l as a dc:l~l d11<: to the stale 
arcl tl1e co11llty 111 proport1011 to tiH: arnouut 
ofltiJI: assistance paid l>y c:ach, n :s peclivdy: lf I 
clJJriui!, the li~c: or on ~IH : dc.:all• of any pcrso~1 
1 
rc:cc:ivini!, ass1sLtncc•, 1t 1s _lo1111d tl1al the re-
dpi<'llt was possesscd of lllCOIII< : or prop_erly ~ 
iuc ·xcc·ss of the <tllllll.llil n·p~1rl<'d or asccJ:ta_med 
at tl 1c: tinH: of ).!,rantllli!, ass1sta1H '<', and 1f 1t he 
~IHIII ' ll that slll:IJ assi~taiJc·c : was ol>tainc<l hy an 
inc·ligihle rccipi<'nt, the total aiiiOlllll of lite 
as~i~taJI('<~ 111ay he n ·eovc·rc·d hy tl1e stale: <le-
part11wnt of social wclf'an: as :1 _fo11rtl1 _class 
rJ;tilll frolll the cstatc: ol tll(: n :<'IJlll'Jil or m au 
action ]))'(lllgiJl agai11st tl1c: JTcipic·nt wllile 




21. For example, Kansas does not extend its restrictions 
on wage garnishment to any debt due for any state or federal 
tax, K. S. A. 1971 Supp. 60-2310(e)(3). This type of::pui:KidJepublic 
debt, howe~er, d~fers from the instant case, in reprsenting a 
wrongful w1thholdmg from the state of a tax on asset~ in the actual 
possession of the taxpayer and not, as here, a debt contracted under 
circumstances of indigency. 
zz. , 
~ The statutes of other states, e. g. , Alaska, South 
Carolina, West Virginia provide, as does Kansas, for recovery 
against indigent defendants in the same manner as on other 
judgments. Unlike Kansas, however, these states do not 
expressly subject indigents to conditions to which other civil 
judgment debtors are not liable. 
See note 8, supra...t-
~
-z.._.'f ~ Gideon v. Wainwright, supra; Douglas v. California, supra; 
Argersinger v. Hamlin, u.s. __ (1972). 
.z_{"~ Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970); .Mempa v. I 
Rhay, 389 U. S. 128 ( 1967); United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218 
(1967); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Mr. J. Harvie Wilkinson, m DATE: May 21, 1972 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
No. 71-11 James v. Strange 
Confirming our talk this morning, I think your excellent first 
draft provides at least 75% of a fine opinion. 
I do not believe, however, that the interest argument will 
stand critical analysis. I would be inclined to omit it as a discrimina-
tory feature, using it only to emphasize the total package of disadvantages 
imposed upon an indigent defendant and especially one who has been 
imprisoned, and is faced with the nearly insuperable task of starting 
out to reestablish himself as a viable, self-supporting citizen. 
In this connection, we have agreed that it is desirable to 
emphasize the effect of denying a judgment debtor the benefit of the 
garnishment exemption. I suggest that you read a little general law 
on garnishment exemptions and perhaps include - in the text or foot-
notes - some commentary on the philosophy and utility of the 
garnishment exee:ptiona This is the bedrock "guts" of the discrimina-
tion in this case, as I see it. 
I have dictated one rider that might fit in at the plaee indicated 
oo page 9, and which - with appropriate editing - can be used to 
2. 
lead up to a discussion of the importance and the utility - in terms of 
social ends - of the garnishment exemption. 
My rider also deals with the particularly disadvantaged position 
of the defendant who is acquitted. It is possible that a majority of the 
Court would want to hold invalid any recoupment protision against 
an individual found to be innocent. The theory would be that if the 
state falsely charged a citizen, he ought not be required to repay the 
state for his counsel I do not want to go this far, or to include 
language in the opinion that would be so construed. A state muat 
, nave probable cause before charging one with crime. The accused 
~· .... ~., ~ 
, . ; party is not compelled to aeeept free counsel. He does so with presumed 
knowledge of the ree oupment statute. 
L. F. P., Jr. 
. ~~· 
jhW/SS 5/23/72 
{_!1- _11 _ 
Cont igency footnote on the notice point. 
It is true, of course, that K. S. A. 1971 Supp., 22-4504 provides 
that "the judge or magistrate shall inform the defendant for whom 
counsel is appointed that the amount expended by the :i state in 
providing counsel and other defense services will be entered as a 
judgment against him . . . " This provision cannot, however, control 
the disposition of the case. At no point in the briefs or argument 
of the parties or in the opinion of the court below was this provision 
even referred to, much less debated. The Kansas courts, moreover, 
sfcJ..li 
have applied this recoupment regardless of whether notice was 
given and even when the failure to give notice was brought to the 
court's attention. 
Most importantly, however, no notice is required as to the 
very features of the statute we find most objectionable. Only general 
notice that a judgment will be entered against defendant is required, 
---and no notice whatsoever need be given the defendant&f the 
___...., 
interest accumulation on his d~or the denial to him of vital 
protective exemptions. 
2. 
The statutorily required notice cannot overc orne the 
constitutional infirmities of the statute. A decision on this 
ground would only avoid the central problem in this case: the 
discriminatory operation of the statute on appellee and numerous 
other indigent defendants. 
Rider A, p. 10 (James v. strange) 5/23/72 
Though we emphasize the adverse impact of the unavailability 
of the garnishment exemptions, the other protective provisions 
afforded judgment debtors by Kansas law - and denied indigent 
0 As 
defendant dB1mt debtor A are not inconsequential. ~noted 
above, execution may not be levied on specified categories of 
a debtor's tangible personal property. For the head of a family, 
these exemptions include "furnishings, food, fuel and clothing, 
means of transportation" as well as personal clothing. Yet, 
the recoupment statute before us in this case provides flatly that 
~"None of the exemptions provided for in the code of civil 
procedure shall apply to any such judgment (against an indigent 
defendant), but no such judgment shall be levied against a homestead. '1 
If one in the hapless circumstances of being an indigent defendant 
were fortunate enough to have a "homestead", its protection from 
execution would afford slight comfort if the sheriff is free to 
levy on the furnishings and other items of personal property. 
-- A 
~· ~h- ~~4~1AJ~~~d~:r~-l 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Mr. J. Harvie Wilkinson, Jr. DATE: May 26, 1972 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
No. 70-87 Police Department v. Mosley 
You might take a look at Justice Marshall's opinion in the above 
case, which involves an equal protection issue, and invalidates a 
Chicago ordinance. 
,, 
I do not see anything in the opinion that causes me to think changes l.• 
are necessary in James v. strange. Yet, a good many cases are cited, 
and it might be well to take a look at the opinion. 
L. F. P., Jr. 
1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 71-11 
James R. James, Judicial Ad-
ministrator, et al., 0 n Appeal from the 
Appellants, United States District 
Court for the District v. 
David E. Strange. 
of Kansas. 
[May -, 1972] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
This case presents a constitutional challenge to a 
Kansas recoupment statute, whereby the State may 
recover in subsequent civil proceedings counsel and other 
legal defense fees expended for the benefit of indigent 
defendants. The three-judge court belo·w held the stat-
ute unconstitutional, finding it to be an impermissible 
burden upon the right to counsel established in Gideon 
Y. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963).1 The State ap-
pealed and we noted jurisdiction, - U. S. -. 
The relevant facts are not disputed. Appellee Strange 
was arrested and charged with first-degree robbery under 
Kansas law. He appeared before a magistrate, professed 
indigency, and accepted appointed counsel under the 
Kansas Aid to Indigent Defendants Act. 2 Appellee was 
then tried in the Shawnee County District Court on 
the reduced charge of pocket picking. He pled guilty 
and received a suspended sentence and three years 
probation. 
1 Tho opinion of tho three-judge court is reported in 323 F. Supp. 
1230 (Kan. 1971). 
2 Kan. Stat. Ann. 1971 Supp. 22-4501 to 22-4515. 
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Thereafter, appellee's counsel applied to the State 
1for payment for his services and received $500 from 
the Aiel to Indigent Defendants Fund. Pmsuant to 
Kansas' recoupment statute, the Kansas Judicial Ad-
ministrator requested appellee to reimburse the State 
within 60 days or a judgment for the $500 would be 
docketed against him. Appellee con tends this proce-
dure violates his constitutional rights. 
I 
It is necessary at the outset to explain the terms and 
operation of the challenged statute.~ When the State 
:• Knn. Stat. Ann. 1!)71 Supp. 22-451~. The statute rends as 
follows: 
"(n) Whrnever any expend it urr h:ts been made from the :tid to 
indigent defrndnnts fund tn j)fOYicle rounsrl and othrr clrfrnse srrv-
ires to nny dcfrndnnt~. ns nut horizrcl by srrtion 10 fG2-3110], such 
clcfenclant 8hnll be liable to the ~tnte of J\nns[ls for :t sum oq1tal 
to such rxpcncliture, and ~urh sum m[ly be rrcovored from the clr-
fend:mt by tlw st[ltc of 1\:m~ns for the benefit of the fund to aiel 
indigent defoncbnts. Wit bin thirty (~0) d:t~·s after such expencli-
turr, tho judicial admini~trntor shall oend a notice b~· rrrtifircl mnil 
to tho person on whose behnlf ~uch cxpenditnrc wn~ mndr, which 
notirr shall state tho nmount of tho exprnditnrr [Inc[ sh:tll dem:md 
thnt the defrndant pny snicl sum to the st[ltr of Km1S[IS for tho 
brne.fit. of tho fund to nicl indigent drfrnclnnts within sixty (GO) clays 
a[trr recri])t of surh not irr. The noticr shall ~tntr th:tt such sum 
boramo duo on thr dntr of thr exprnditurr and the sum drm[lnded 
"·ill bear intrrrst at six prr('rnt (6%) prr nnnum from the clnr 
clnto until paid. Fnilurr to rrcrive any snrh notirr shnll not rrlievr 
the prrson to whom it i . .; [lddre~~ed from thr pn~·mrnt of the RUm 
dnimrd ~mel an~· interrst duo thrroon. 
"Should the sum d('ma nclecl rrmain unpnid n t t hr expim tion of 
~ixty (GO) d[ly~ after m[liling ihr notice, tho judicial administrntor 
shnll rortif~· an nb:<traet of thr total amount of thr unpaid drmand 
:lllcl intrrr5t thrroon to thr clerk of the cliotrict rourt of thr ronnty 
in whic-h counsel was nppoint eel or t hr rxprndit me [lulhorizod by 
tho court, and snrh clerk sh[lll enter the total amount thrreof on 
his judgment dorket and ~:1icl total amount, togethrr with the intN-
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provides indigent defendants with counsel or other legal 
services, the defendant becomes obligated to the State 
for the amount expended in his behalf. Within 30 days 
r;.:t thereon at the r:~tP of ~ix percent (fi%) per :~nnum, from the 
dnte of the expenditure thereof until paid, ~hnll becomr n judgment 
in the onmr manner and to the snme extent n~ any other judgment 
under the eode of ri,·il procl'Cime and ~hall becomp a lien on real 
e~tate from nne! aftrr tlw time of filing thereof. A tran~cript of 
said judgment m:1)' be filrcl in :wot her ('Ounty :~nd become a lien 
upon renl eRtnte, located in ~uch county. in the ~arne mnnnrr a~ is 
providrd in cn~e of otlwr judgment,. Exrrution. gnrni,hment, or 
other proceedings in aiel of execution mny is~ue within the county, 
or to any other count~·. on i'aid judgmrnt. in like manner as on 
judgment~ unclrr tlw coclr of ei,·il procrdurr. None of the exemp-
tions pro,·idecl for in the ('Ode of ci\'il procedure Rhnll apply to nny 
smh judgment, but no such judgment shall be levied ngninst a 
homr~trad. If execution ~hall not he i'Ued out \\'ithin five (5) yrnr:; 
from the date of the entr~· of nny such judgment, or if fi,·e (5) 
! ' f':tr~ Rhnll havr intervrnrd brtween the dnte of the la~t execution 
issued on such judgnwnt and the timr of suin~J: out another writ 
of rxrrution thereon. such juclgmrnt shall become dormant nnd 
"hall cra~e to opNatr as a lien on real r~tatc of the judgmrnt drbtor. 
Such dormnnt judgment m:t~· br rrYi,·ed in like manner as dorm.1nt 
.iudgmrnt~ undrr the code of rid procedure. 
"(b) iVhene,·rr any exprnditme has brcn mad<:> from the aid to 
iucli~J:rnt drfrncl:tnts fund to provide counsel and other drfeme 
srn·iee~ to nny defendant, a~ authorizrcl by ~ection 10 [62-3110], n, 
snm e(jwll to ~uch rxpendit ure may be recovered by the state of 
K:tnf':tS for the benefit of thr aid to i.udig;rnt defrndant~ fnncl from 
an,\· prr:'ons to whom tiH' indigent dcfrnd:mt f'hnll haYr transfrrred 
any of his property without adequate monrtar~' consideration after 
thr commission of thr alleged crimr, to the extrnt of the Y[tlur of 
snrh trnnsfrr, nncl such per~on~ are hen·by made liable to rcimbur.~e 
the state of Kansa~ for such exprnditures with inte1wt at six per-
cent (6%) prr nnnnm. An~· art ion to rrcover judgment for such 
rxpencliturr~ shnll be prosecuted by thr attorney general, who may 
rrquirr the as~i~tnnce of thl' county attornr)· of the eounty in which 
I he a<·tion is to be filed , and surh action f'hall be go\·emrd by the 
pro,·i~iom; of thr rodr of ei\'il procedurr relating to actions for the 
rrco,·ery of money. No nction ,Judi be brought ngninst any prr~on 
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of the expenditure, defendants are notified of their debt 
and given 60 days to repay it:' If the sum remains 
unpaid after the 60-day period, a judgment is docketed 
against defendant for the unpaid anwunt. Six per-
cent annual interest runs on the debt from the elate 
the expenditure "·as made. The debt becomes a lien 
on the real estate of defendant and may be executed 
by garnishment or in any other manner provided by 
the Kansas Code of Civil Procedure. The indigent de-
fendant is not, however, accorded any of the exemp-
tions provided by that code for other judgment debtors 
except the homestead exemption. If the judgment is 
not executed within five years, it becomes dormant, 
eeases to operate as a lien on the debtor's real estate, 
but may be revived in the same manner as other dor-
mant judgments under the code of civil procedure." 
Several features of this procedure merit mention. The 
entire program is administered by the judicial admin-
istrator, a public official, but appointed counsel are pri-
vate practitioners. The statute apparently leaves to 
administrative discretion whether, and under \vhat cir-
cumstances, enforcement of the judgment will be sought. 
Recovered sums do, however, revert to the Aid to In-
digent Defendants Fund. 
The Kansas statute is but one of many state re-
coupment laws applicable to counsel fees and expendi-
under the provision· on this section to recover for sums expended 
on behalf of an indigent defendant, unless snch action shall have 
been filed within two (2) yenrs nfter the date of the expenditure 
from the fund to nid indigent defendants." 
4 Fnilure to receive notice, however, does not rrlieve the person 
to whom it is addreo:sed of the obligation. 
5 A dormant judgment mny be revived within two years of the 
date on which the judgment became dormnnt. Rnn. Stnt. Ann. 
1971 Supp. 60-2404. 
• il,· 
71-11-0PINION 
.TAMES v. STRANGE 
tures paid for indigent dcfendants.6 The statutes vary 
widely in their terms. Under some statutes, the in-
digent's liability is to the county in IYhich he is tried; 
in others to the State. Alabama and Indiana make 
assessment and recovery of an indigent's counsel fees 
discretionary with the court. Florida's recoupment lavY 
has no statute of limitations and the State is deemed 
to have a perpetual lien against the defendant's real 
and personal property and estate. 7 Idaho, on the other 
hand, has a five-year statute of limitations on the re-
covery of an "indigent's" concealed assets at the time 
of trial and a three-year statute for the recovery of 
later acquired ones. In Virginia and West Virginia, 
the amount paid to court appointed counsel is assessed 
only against convicted defendants as part of costs, while· 
Oregon's recoupment statute expressly appliE>s "whether 
or not a trial is had and whether or not the indi-
vidual prevails." The same Oregon statute assesses 
costs against defendant on a formula prescribed by the 
Public Defender Committee while North Dakota sets 
6 There is also a fedrral rrimbursement provi~ion, 18 U. S. C. 
§ 3006A (f): 
"Receipt of other payments.-Whcncver the United States magis-
trate or the court finds that funds are available for paymrnt from 
or on behalf of a person furni~hed representation , it may authorize 
or direct that such funds be paid to the appointrd attorney, to the 
bnr association or legal aid agency or community defender organiza-
tion which provided the appointed attomcy, to any person or or-
ganization authorized pursuant to subsection (c) to render investi-
gative, expert, or at her srrvices, or to the court for deposit in the 
Treasury as a reimburscmf'nt to the appropriation, current at the 
time of payment, to carry out the provisions of this section. Except 
as so authorized or directed, no such person or organization may 
request or accept any payment or promi~e of payment for repre-
senting a defendant." 
7 The board of connty commi~~ioners has di,;crction to compromise 
or release the lien , however. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 27.5G (1971 Supp.) . 
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counsel fees "at a reasonable rate to be determined 
by the comt." It is thus readily apparent that state 
reimbursement la\\'s and procedures differ significantly 
in their particulars.8 Given the wide differences in the 
featmes of these statutes, any broadside pronouncement 
on their general validity would be inappropriate. 
We turn therefore to the Kansas statute. aware that 
our reviewing function is a limited one. \Yo do not 
inquire whether this statute is "·ise, or desirable. or 
"\\'hether it is based on assumptions scientifically sub-
stantiated." Roth v. United Stales, 354 U. S. 476, 501 
(1057) (Harlan. J .. concurring). Misguided laws may 
nonetheless be constitutionaL It has been noted both 
in the briefs and at argument that only $17,000 has 
been recovered under the statute in its almost t"·o years 
of operation, and that this amount is negligible compared 
to the total expended.n Our task, ho,Yever, is not to 
weigh this statute's effectiveness but its constitutionality. 
Whether the returns under the statute justify the ex-
pense, time, nne! efforts of state officials is for the on-
goillg supervision of tho legislative branch. 
Tho court below invalidated this statute on the grounds 
that "it needlessly encourageP. indigents to do "·ithout 
counsel and consequently infringes on the right to coun-
~State recoupment stntutc~. inrludin~ those quoted nhoYc, nrc ns 
follows: 
"Ala. Code, Tit. 17, § 318 (12) (1969 Supp.): Alnskn Stnt. Ann. 
19o2 § 12.55-020; Fin. Stat. Ann.§ 27.56 (1971 Supp.): Icbho Cod<:> 
Ann . § 19-SM~ (1971 Supp.): Incl. Ann. Rtat. 19.56, 9-3501 (Hl71 
Rupp): Iown Cocl<' Ann. § 77.5.!) (1971 Supp.); Mel. Code 1966, 
Art. 26 § 9; !\. D. C. C. , § 29-07-01.1; N. l\f. St:1t. Ann., 1953, 
§ 41-22-7; Ohio n. C. § 2941-51 (1970 Supp.): Ore. Tiev. Stnt. 
§ 137.205; S.C. Code 1962, § 17-283 (1971 Supp.): 2 T<'x. C. C. P. , 
Art. 26.05 §§ 8, 5: Tex. C. C. P., Art. 101R: Vn . Code Ann.§ 14.1-184 
(1971 Snpp.); W. Ya. Code Ann. (19.15) § GlOO; 29 \Vis. Stat. Ann. 
§ 2.5fl.6G." 
u For fillral 1971 $-WO,OOO was npproprinted to fum! thC' progrnm. 
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sel as explicated in Gideon , .. lVainwrighl, supra." 322 
F. Supp., at -. In Gideon, counsel had been denied 
an indigent defendant charged with a felony because 
his "·as not a capital case. This Court often has voided 
state statutes and practices which denied to accused 
indigents the means to present effective defenses in 
courts of law. Doug~as v. Cal1'jornia, 372 U. S. 353 
(1063); Draper V. rVash'ington, 372 u. S. 487 (Hl63); 
Lane v. Brown, 372 U. S. 477 (1063); Griffin v. Illinois, 
351 U.S. 12 (19G5). Here, ho\\'ever, Kansas has enacted 
laws both to provide and compensate from public funds 
counsel for the indigent.'" There is certainly 110 denial 
of the right to counsel in the strictest sense. \Yhether 
the statutory obligations for repayme11t impcrmi~sibly 
deter the exercise of this right is a question \\'e need 
not reach, for we find the statute before us constitu-
tionaJly infirm on othtC'r grounds. 
II 
The State has asserted in argument before this Court 
that the statute ''has attempted to treat them findigent 
defendants] the same as would any civil judgment debtor 
be treated in the State courts, ... " " Again , in its 
brief the State asserts that "for all practical purposes 
the methods available for enforcement of the judgment 
are the same as thoE=e provided by the Code of Civil 
Procedure or any other civil judgment." ~~ The chal-
lenged portion of the Ftatute thrice alludes to means of 
debt recovery prescribed by the Kansas Code of Civil 
Procedure.' " 
10 Scr n. 2, svpra. 
11 Transcript of Or[! I Ar~nmrnt, p. 9. The Statr concedes that 
rxrmption~ for olhrr ri1·il jnd!!mrnt debtors nrc broader th[ln for 
incli~rnt drfrllCbnl ~, a matt r r we will ndclress forthwith. !d., p. 10 .. 
1 ~ Brief of Apprllnnt, p. 7. 
1 3 Sec Kan. Stn t. Ann. 1971 Supp. G0-701 to G0-724, G0-2401 to 
60-2419. 
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Yet the ostensibly equal treatment of indigent de-
fendants with other civil judgment debtors recedes 
sharply as one examines the statute more closely. The 
statute stipulates that save for the homestead. "none 
of the exemptions provided for in the code of civil pro-
cedure shall apply to any such judgment .... " 11 This 
provision strips from indigent defendants the array of 
protective exemptions Kansas has erected for other civil 
judgment debtors, including restrictions on the amount 
of disposable earnings subject to garnishm.ent, protec-
. tion of the debtor from wage garnishment at times of 
severe personal or family sickness, and exemption from 
attachment and execution on a debtor's personal cloth-
ing, books and tools of trade. For the head of a family, 
the exemptions afforded other judgment debtors become 
·more extensive, and cover furnishings, food, fuel and 
clothing, means of transportation, pension funds, and 
even a family burial plot or crypt.1" 
Of the above exemptions, none is more important 
to a debtor than the exemption of his wages from un-
restricted garnishment. The debtor's wages are his sus-
tenance, with which he supports himself and his family. 
The average low income wage earner spends nearly 
nine-tenths of those wages for items of immediate con-
sumption.16 This Court has recognized the potential of 
certain garnishment proceedings to "impose tremendous 
hardships on wage earners with families to support." 
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U. S. 337, 340 
( 1969) .17 Kansas has likewise perceived the burden to 
1 'J The exemptions in the civil code arc set forth in Kan. StaL Ann. 
1971 Supp. 60-2301 to 60-2311. 
1 r. Kan. Stat. Ann. 1971 Supp. 60-2304 and 60-2308. 
1a Bureau of L::~bor Stati~tics , Handbook at Labor Statistics 281 
( 1968). Low-wnge eamers n re defined ns families with nfter-tnx 
income of less than $5,000. 
17 The Court in Sniadach held that Wisconsin'~ prejudgment wage 
garnishment procedure, a~ a taking of property without notice 
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' a debtor and his family v,·hen wages may be subject 
to wholesale garnishment. Consequently, under its 
code of civil procedure, the maximum which can be 
garnisheed is the lesser of 25o/o of a debtor's weekly 
disposable earnings or the amount by which those earn-
ings exceed 30 times the federal minimum hourly wage. 
No one creditor may issue more than one garnishment 
during any one month, and no employer may discharge 
an employee because his earnings have been garnisheed 
for a single indebtedness.18 For Kansas to deny pro-
tections such as these to the once criminally accused 
is to risk denying him the means needed to keep him-
self and his family afloat. 
The indigent's predicament under this statute comes 
into sharper focus when compared with that of one who 
has hired counsel in his defense. Should the latter 
prove unable to pay and a judgment be obtained against 
him, his obligation would become enforceable under the 
relevant provisions of the Kansas Code of Civil Proce-
dure. But, unlike the indigent under the recoupment 
statute, the code's exemptions would protect this judg-
ment debtor. 
It may be argued that an indigent accused, for whom 
the State has provided counsel, is in a. different class 
with respect to collection of his indebtedness than a 
and prior hearing, violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
18 Kan . Stat. Ann. 1971 Supp. 60-2310 (b) and 60-2311. Sec-
tion 60-2310 also provide~ further drbtor protection from wage 
garnishment at a time or disabling personal sickness and from pro-
fessional collecting agencies. Sec Kan. Stat. Ann. 1971 Supp. 60-
2310 (c) and (d). Sec also Bennett, The 1970 Kansas Legi~lature 
in Review, 39 J. 13. A. K 107, 178 (1970), which points out that 
the State's restrictions on garnis hment~ haYe been made to conform 
lo Tit. III of the federal Con~umer Credit Protection Act, 82 Stat. 
163. Kansns, however, provided significant wage exemptions from 
garnishment long before the fcdcml act was passed. 
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judgment creditor whose obligation arose from a private 
transaction. But other Kansas statutes providing for 
recoupment of public assistance to indigents do not in-
clude the severe provisions imposed on indigent defend-
ants in this case. Kansas has enacted, as have many 
other States, laws for state recovery of public welfare 
assistance when paid to an ineligible recipient. 1!' Y ct 
the Kansas welfare recipient, unlike the indigent defend-
ant, is not denied the customary exemptions.~n 
19 Knn. Stat. Ann. HJ71 Supp. 3!)-7Hlb; 59-200(). Section 39-
719b dcnls mninl.v with thc· recovrr~· of :ll'~'i;;tanPe from nn ineli~ible 
reeipient. Yet even when the welfare recipient il' deemed to have 
dcfrnuded the Stnte , he ~till el'rnpt·~ the immrdiatr intrre~t nccumu-
lations :wd clenird of exemption!' impo~ed on indigent dcfend:mts: 
"3fl-719b. Duty of recipient to report chnn~es; Hrtion by bonrd; 
rccowry of :1>'~'i~t:mce obl:tined by ineli~ihle recipient. If nt nny 
time during thr eontinuance of a,;~i.'tnnce to any person, the recipient 
thereof becomes poi'l'el'.wl of nn~· property or income in cxcrss of 
the amount ascertnined at the time of grnnting nl'sistmwe, it shnll 
be thr duty of the recipient to notif~· thr rotmty bonrd of sorial 
welfare immediate]~· of the rerript or po~~rs~ion of ~uch property 
or income and l'nid count~· board may, nftrr im·el'ti~ntion, enncel tho 
ai'~istnnce in nerordance with the circuml'tanrr~. 
".\n~· as~i~tnncr paid shall br reco\"C'rable b~· the count~· bonrd as 
a debt, due to the statr nnd the count~· in proportion to thr nmount 
of the a~"istance pa.id b~· each. rri'pectivrl.1·: If during tlw lifr or on 
the death of any per~on rrrri1·ing al'~ist:mcr, it is found that the 
rrcipirnt "·as possc,~ed of ii~('Ol11<' or proprrty in rxre:'i' of thr amount 
reported or mwcrtained at the time of gr:mt in~ :JI'~i~t a nee, and if it 
be shown that ~ur-h a~si"taner waR oht:tinrd b~· an incli~ible recipient, 
thr totnl amount of the a~~i~tance mn~· hr rcroverrd by thr stntC' 
dPpartmrnt. of soc.ial wPif:1rc ai' a fourth cla~l' ci:Jim from thr r~tatr 
of thr reripient or in an netion brou~tht a~~:ain"t tbr reeipient while 
li1·ing;. fL. 1953, r. 224, ~ 2: .June 30.]" 
20 Therr apprar~ to be n. furthrr di~rrimirmtion a~~:nin"t thr incli-
~ent defendant us rontra~tecl with the drlinquent "·elf arc recipient. 
TllC' rrcoupmrnt statute' appJirablr to indigent defendants proYidC's 
for the nrrmnnlation of ll% amnr:tl interr~t from the datr exprndi-
turrs arc made for coun"el or othrr lrgnl drfcnse costs. Knn. Stat.. 
Ann. 1971 Supp. 22-4510. The interrst build-up for the indigent 
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\Ve recogni:w, of course, that the Rtate's claim to 
reimburse may take precedence, under appropriate cir-
cumstances, over the claims of private creditors and that 
enforcement procedures with respect to judgments need 
not be identical."' This does not mean, however, that 
a Rtate may impose unduly harsh or discriminatory 
terms merely because the obligation is to the public 
treasury rather than to a private creditor. The State 
itself in the statute before us analogizes the judgment 
lien against the indigent defendant to other "judg-
ments under the code of civil procedure." But the 
statute then strips the indigent defendant of the very 
exemptions designed primarily to benefit debtors of low 
and marginal incomes. 
The Kansas statute provides for reconpment wheth01· 
the indigent defendant is acquitted or found guilty. If 
dr frndant would not be in ~ubst:mti[ll. In thr :fh·r year~ brfore the 
judgmrnt. hrr[)mp dormant . intrrr~ t nerumulations rould lift np-
prllrc'~ $500 debt to almo~t 8670. If t hr dormant judgment is 
re,·iwd within the stntu torily prr~cribrd two yPars, thr principal 
and int err~t might total ovn S7.50. (Thr intere~ t presumably would 
run whilr thr judgmrnt \\'a~ dormant Hiner "n dormnnt judgment 
may be rrvi~rd and haw the samr forcr and rffrrt as if it had not 
become dormant .... " Kan. Stat. Ann. 1971 Rupp. G0-2404.) 
Kansa~ nlso hnH a Htn lutc J1rovicling that all judgments shall bear 
S% int err~ t from thr dav on which the·)· arc rcndrrecl. J<an . Stat. 
Ann. 1971 Supp. 1G-20~ (recently nmrndrcl from G%)- Prrsumably 
thiR statutr wonld cover thr "drbts" of wrlfarr rec ipients once they 
arP rcclucrd to judgmmt. Thr drht of the indigrnl defendant , how-
rver, nmH from the d;tte the n~si~t:mrr i~ grnntrd , whil e any intrrrRt 
on the debt of a wr lfare recipient would prrRumbly run from the 
date of judgment. 
~~For rxample, 1\:;m~as dors not rxtcnd it;; rxcmption~ with respect 
to wage gnrni~hmrnt to any drbt due for any ~ tat e or federal tax, 
K:m. Stat . Ann. 1971 Supp. 60-2310 (c) (3). This type of public 
drbt, howevrr, differ:; from the instant case in rrprrsenting a wrong-
ful withholdin~ from thr Statr of a t :n on n;.;sct~ in the actual 
pos~rs~ion of the taxpay~r nnd not, as here, a debt cant racted under 
circumstances of indigcnry. 
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acquitted, the indigent finds himself obligated to rrpay 
the State for a service the need for which rc'sultecl from 
the State's prosecution. It is difficult to see why such 
a defendant, adjudged to be innocent of the State's 
charge, should be denied basic exemptions accorded all 
other judgment debtors. The indigent defendant who 
is found guilty is uniquely disad va.nted in terms of the 
practical operation of the statute. A criminal convic-
tion usually limits employment opportuuities. Th.is is 
especially true where a prison sentence has been served. 
It is in the interest of society and the State that such 
a defendant, upon satisfaction of the criminal penal-
ties imposed, be afforded a reasonable opportuuity of 
employment, rehabilitation and return to useful citizen-
ship. There is limited incentive to seek legitimate em-
ployment when, after serving a sentence during which 
interest has accumulated on the indebtedness for legal 
services, the indigent knov,·s that his wages ·will be gar-
nisheed without the benefit of any of the customary 
exemptions. 
Appellee in this case has now married, works for a 
modest wage, and has recently become a father. To 
deprive him of all protection of his wages and intimate 
personalty discourages the search for self-sufficiency 
which might make of the criminally accused a contrib-
uting citizen. Not only does this treatment not accord 
with the treatment of indigent recipients of public wel-
fare or with that of other civil judgment debtors,22 but 
the Kansas statute also appears to be alone among re-
coupment laws applicable to indigent defendants in 
22 The statutrs of Yariou~ other States, e. g., Alaska, South Caro-
lina, and West Vir!!:inia, proYide, as does Kansas, for recovery against 
indigent defendants in t he same manner as on other judgmrnt s. 
Unlike Kansas, howeyer, these States do not expressly subject indi-
gents to conditions 1o which other civil judgment debtors are not 
liable. See n. 8, supra, for citations. 
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expressly denying them the benefit of basic debtor 
exemptions."3 
III 
In Rinaldi v. Yaeger, 384 U.S. 305 (1966), the Court 
considered a situation comparable in some respects to 
the case at hand. Rinaldi involved a New Jersey statute 
which required only those indigent defendants who were 
sentenced to confinement in state institutions to reim-
burse the State the costs of a transcript on appeal. In 
Rinaldi, as here, a broad ground of decision was urged, 
namely, that the statute unduly burdened an indigent's 
right to appeal. The Court found, however, a different 
basis for decision, holding that "to fasten a financial 
burden only upon those unsuccessful appellants who are· 
confined in state institutions ... is to make an invidious 
discrimination" in violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause. !d., at 309. 
Rinaldi affirmed that the Equal Protection Clause "im-
poses a requirement of some rationality in the nature of 
the class singled out." !d., at 308-309. This require-
ment is lacking where, as in the instant case, the Sta.te 
has subjected indigent defendants to such discriminatory 
conditions of repayment. This case, to be sure, differs 
from Rinaldi in that here all indigent defendants are 
treated alike. But to impose these harsh conditio11s on 
a class of debtors who were provided counsel as required 
by the Constitution is to practice, no less than in Rinaldi, 
a discrimination which the Equal Protection Clause 
proscribes. 
The Court assumed in Rinaldi, arguendo "that a leg-
islature could validly provide for replenishing a county 
treasury from the pockets of those who have directly 
benefitted from county expenditures." !d., at 309. We 
note here also that the state interests represented by 
"'
1 Sec n. 8, SU]Jra, for citations. 
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recoupment laws may prove important ones. Recoup-
ment proceedings may protect the State from fraudu-
lent concealment of assets and fa.Jse assertions of 
indigency. Many States, moreover, face expanding 
criminal dockets, and this Court has required appointed 
counsel for indigents in widening classes of cases~· and 
stages of prosecution.~" Such trends have heightened 
the burden on public revenues, and recoupment laws 
reflect legislative efforts to recover some of the added 
costs. Finally, federal dominance of the Nation's major 
revenue sources has encouraged State and local govern-
ments to seek new methods of conserving public funds, 
not only through the recoupment of indigents' counsel 
fees but of other forms of public assistance as well. 
We thus recognize that state recoupment statutes may 
bi)oken legitimate state interests. But these interests 
are not thwarted by requiring more even treatment of 
indigent criminal defendants with other classes of debtors 
to whom the statute itself repeatedly makes reference. 
State recoupment laws, notwithstanding the state in-
terests they may serve, need not blight in such dis-
criminatory fashion the hopes of indigents for self 
sufficiency and self respect. The statute before us em-
bodies elements of punitiveness and discrimination which 
violate the rights of citizens to equal treat1nent under 
the law. 
The judgment of the court below is affirmed. 
24 Gideon v. Wainwright, supra; Douglas v. California, supra; 
Argersinger v. II amlin, - U. S. - (1972). 
2 " Coleman v. Alabama, 390 U.S. 1 (1970); Mempa v. Rhay, 389 
U. S. 128 (1967); United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218 (1967); 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966). 
NOTE: Where It Is de!'nwd d~s.lrubl~. a syllubus (headnote) will 
be relea.,ed, as Is bdug dOill' iu <'OilllNltlon with this case, at th~ time 
th~ opinion Is issuPtl. Tit!' syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion 
of the Court but has hecn Jll'O[lllrNl hy tl1c Hrporter of D<>dslons for 
the convrnien<'P ot: the reuder. See United /:!tate• v. lJett·oit £umber 
Oo., 200 U.S. 321, 337. 
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This case presents a constitutional challenge to a 
Kansas recoupment statute, whereby the State may 
recover in subsequc>nt civil proceedings counsel and other 
legal defense fees expended for the benefit of indigent 
defendants. The three-judge court below held the stat-
ute unconstitutional. finding it to be an impermissible 
burden upon the right to counsel established in Gideon 
v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963).1 The State ap-
pealed and we noted judsdiction, - U. S. -. 
The relevant facts are not disputed. Appellee Strange 
was arrested and charged with first-degree robbery under 
Kansas la·w. He appeared before a magistrate, professed 
indigency, and accepted ap11ointed counsel under the 
Kansas Aid to Indigent Defendants Act. 2 Appelle0 was 
then tried in the Shawnee County District Court on 
the reduced charge of pocket picking. He pled guilty 
and received a suspended sentence and three years 
probation. 
1 The opinion of the three-judge court is reported in 323 F. Supp. 
1230 (Kan. 1971). 
2 Kan. Stat. Ann. 1971 Supp. 22-4501 to 22-!515. 
71-11-0PINION 
2 JAMES v. STRANGE 
Thereafter, appellee's counsel applied to the State 
for payment for his services and received $500 from 
the Aid to Indigent Defendants Fund. Pursuant to 
Kansas' recoupment statute, the Kansas Judicial Ad-
ministrator requested appellee to reimburse the State 
within 60 days or a judgment for the $500 would be 
docketed against him. Appel1ee contends this proce-
dure violates his constitutional rights. 
I 
It is necessary at the outset to explain the t!mns and 
operation of the challenged statute." When the State 
3 K::m. Stat. Ann. Hl71 Supp. 22-4513. The statute rPads as 
follows: 
"(n) Whenever any expenditure has bren made from the aiel to 
indigent defendants fund to proYide rounsrl and other drfensr serv-
irr~ to any drfendant, ns aut horizrcl by section 10, such defend-
ant shall be liable to the sl:ltP of Knnsas for a ~um equal to such 
expenditure, and such sum ma:> be recon•recl from the defrnclant 
by the state of Kan~ns for thr benefit of the fund to aiel indi-
grnt defendants. Within thirty (:30) clay~ after ~nch expenclitme, 
the juclirinl administrator ~hall ~rnd a notice by crrtifircl mail 
to the person on whose behalf ~urh expenditure was made, which 
1wtire shall state the amount of the expenditure nne! shall demand 
that the defendant pa~· said sum to the state of Kan~as for the 
benefit of the fund to aid indi,grnt clefencLmts within sixty (60) days 
aft rr receipt of surh notice. The no tire ~hall state that snch sum 
brrame due on the clnte of the rxpPnditurP and the sum clrm::mded 
will bear intrre~t at ~ix prrc·c·nt (6%) prr annum from the clue 
date until paid. Failure to rrcrin an~' such notice shnll not relieYc 
the person to whom it i.;; acldre~~ed from the paymrnt of thr sum 
chimed and any interc:;t due thereon. 
"Should the sum demandrd remain unJ1nid nt the expiration of 
sixt~r (60) days after mniling the notice, the judicial administrator 
sh:-lll certify an abstmct of the total amount of the unpaid demand 
and interest thereon to the clerk of the di8trict court of the county 
in "·hich counsel was appointed or the cxprnditure authorir.ecl by 
the court, and surh clerk shall enter the total amount thereof on 
his judgment docket and s::1id total amount, together with thr inter-
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proYldes indigent defendants with counsel or other legal 
services, the defendant becomes obligated to the State 
for the amount expended in his behalf. Within 30 days 
rBt thrrron at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum, from the 
date of the rxpendilnre thereof nntil paid, sh:-~ll become a jud~ment 
in the same mannrr and to the same extrnt as any other judgment 
under the code of cil'il procedure and shall become a lien on real 
estate from and after tht' time of filing thereof. A tr:-~nscript of 
said judgment m:-ty be filed in another county and become a lien 
upon real estate, located in such county, in the same manner as is 
pro,·ided in c:-~se of other jndgmrnt~. Execution, garnishment, or 
other proceedin~s in :-~id of execution may issue within the county, 
or to any other county, on said judgment in like m:-~nner as on 
judgmrnts undrr the code of civil procedurr. None of the exemp-
tions provided for in the code of civil procedure shall appl~r to any 
snrh judgment, but no such judgment shall be levied against a 
homrstrad. If exerntion slwll not be .·ued out within five (5) ye:-~rs 
from the d:1te of thr entr~· of any snrh judgment. or if five (5) 
ye:-~rs sh:-~ll h:1ve inler\'C'necl between thr dnte of thr last execution 
issued on such judgment and the time of suing out another writ 
of execution thereon, such jud~ent shnll become dormant and 
shall cease to operate as a lim on re:-~1 r~tate of the judgment debtor. 
Surh dormant jud~ment mny be revi1·ecl in like m:-~nner as dormant 
judgments under the code of civil procedure. 
"(b) \Yhen01·er :my expenditnre h:1s bern made from the aiel to· 
indigent clrfcnclants fund to provide cmm~rl and other defense 
srJTicr~ to :1n~· defendant, as authorizrd b~· ~ertion 10, a sum 
equal to such cxprnditurr m:-~y be rrrovrrrd by the state of 
Knns:1s for the benefit of the aid to indigent defrndants fund from 
an~' persons to whom the indigrnt defend:mt shall haYe tr:msferred· 
an~' of his property without adequair monrtary consiclerntion after 
the commiRRion of the allr~cd crimr, to the extent of thr value of 
such transfrr, and such per~onR nre hrreby m:-~de liable to reimburse· 
thP state of Kansas for surh exprnditure::> with interest at six per-
cent (6%) per annum. Any art ion to recover juclgmrnt for such 
expenditures shall be prosecuted by thr attornry general, who may 
require the as~istance of thP cotmty atlornr~· of the county in which 
the action is io be filed, nnd such action shall he governed by the 
provisions of the coclr of civil procrdurc relating to actions for the 
rero1·er~· of money. No action shall be brought against any person 
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of the expenditure, defendants arc notified of their c!C'bt 
aud given 60 days to repay it.4 If the sum rC'mains 
unpaid after the 60-day period, a judgment is docketed 
against defendant for the unpaid amount. Six per-
cent annual interest runs on the debt from the elate 
the expenditure was made. The debt become's a lien 
on the real estate of defendant and may be executed 
by garnishment or in any other manner provided by 
the Kansas Code of Civil Procedure. The indigent de-
fendant is not, however, accorded any of the exemp-
tions provided by that code for other judgment dC'btors 
except the homestead exemption. If the judgment is 
not executed within five years, it becomes dormant, 
ceases to operate as a lien on the debtor's real estate, 
but may be revived in the same manner as other dor-
mant judgments under the code of civil proccdure. 5 
Several features of this procedure merit mention. The 
entire program is administered by the judicial achnin-
istrator, a public official, but appointed counsel are pri-
vate practitioners. The statute apparently leaves to 
administrative discretion whether, and under what cir-
cumstances, enforcement of the judgment will be sought. 
Recovered sums do, however, revert to the Aid to In-
'digent Defendants Fund. 
The Kansas statute is but one of many state re-
coupment laws applicable to counsel fees and expendi-
under the provisions of this section to recover for sums expended 
on behalf of an indigent defendant, unless such action shall have 
been filed within two (2) years after the date of the expenditure 
from the fund to aiel indigent defendants." 
4 Failure to receive notice, however, docs not relieve the person 
to whom it is addressed of the obligation. 
5 A dormant judgment may be revived within two years of the 
date on which the judgment became dormant. Kan. Stn t. Ann .. 
1971 Supp. 60-2404. 
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tures paid for indigent defendants.6 The statutes vary 
widely in their terms. Under some statutes, the in-
digent's liability is to the county in which he is tried; 
in others to the State. Alabama and Indiana make 
assessment and recovery of an iudigent's counsel fees 
discretionary with the court. Florida's recoupment law 
has no statute of limitations and the State is deemed 
to have a perpetual lien against the defendant's real 
and personal property and estatc.7 Idaho, on the other 
hand, has a five-year statute of limitations on the re-
covery of an "indigent's" concealed assets at the time 
of trial and a three-year statute for the recovery of 
later acquired ones. In Virginia and West Virginia, 
the amount paid to court appointed counsel is asf:essed 
only against convicted defendants as part of costs, while 
Oregon's recoupment statute expressly applies "whether 
or not a trial is had and whether or not the indi-
vidual prevails." The same Oregon statute af'sesses 
costs against defendant on a formula prescribed by the 
Public Defender Committee while North Dakota sets 
6 Then' is also a fed<>ral reimbursement provision, 18 U. S. C. 
§ 3005A (f): 
"Receipt of other paymrnts.-Whenever the United States magis-
trate or the court finds that funds arc available for payment from 
or on behalf of a person furnished representation, it may authorize 
or direct that such funds be paid to the appointed attorney, to the 
bar association or legal aid agency or community defender organiza-
tion which provided the appointed attorney, to any person or or-
ganization authorized pursuant to subsection (e) to render investi-
gative, expert, or other services, or to the court for deposit in the 
Treasury as a reimbursement to the appropriation, current at the 
time of payment, to rarry out the provisions of this section. Except 
as so authorized or directed, no such pcr~on or organization may 
request or accept any payment or promise of payment for repre-
senting a defendant." 
7 The board of county eommi~sioners has discretion to compromise 
or release the lien, however. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 27.5G (1971 Supp.). 
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counsel fees "at a reasonable rate to be determined 
by the court." It is thus readily apparent that state 
reimbursement laws and procedures differ significantly 
in their particulars.8 Given the wide differences in the 
features of these statutes, any broadside pronouncement 
on their general validity would be inappropriate. 
\Ve turn therefore to the Kansas statute, aware that 
our reviewing function is a limited one. We do not 
inquire whether this statute is wise, or desirable, or 
"whether it is based on assumptions scientifically sub-
stantiated." Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 501 
(1957) (Harlan, J., concurring). Misguided laws may 
nonetheless be constitutional. It has been noted both 
in the briefs and at argument that only $17,000 has 
been recovered under the statute in its almost two years 
of operation, and that this amount is negligible compared 
to the total expended.n Our task, however, is not to 
weigh this statute's effectiveness but its constitutionality. 
Whether the returns under the statute ,iustify the ex-
pense. time, and efforts of state officials is for the on-
going supervision of the legislative branch. 
The court below invalidated this statute on the grounds 
that "it needlessly encourages indigents to do without 
counsel and consequently infringes on the right to coun-
8 Rtnte recoupment stniuirs, inducting those quolrd a bow, are ns 
follows: 
"Ala. Code. Tit. 17. § 31S (12) (1960 Supp.); Ah~ka Stnt. Ann. 
1962 § 12.55-020; Fla. Stat. Ann.§ 27 .. 56 (1971 Supp.); Iclnho Code 
Ann. § 19-858 (1971 Rupp.); Ind. Ann. Rt:rt. 1956, 9-3501 (1971 
Supp); Iowa Code Ann. § 775.5 (1971 Supp.); Mel. Code 1966, 
Art. 26 § 9; N. D. C. C., § 29-07-01.1; N. l\1. 8tat. Ann., 1953, 
§ 41-22-7; Ohio R C. ~ 29-11-51 (1970 Snpp.): Orr. Rev. Stat. 
§ 1:17.205; S.C. Code 19o2, § 17-283 (1971 8upp.); 2 Tex. C. C. P., 
Art. 26.05 §§ 3, 5; Tex. C. C. P., Art. 101R; Va. Code Ann.§ 14.1-184 
(1971 Supp.); W.Va. Code Ann. (1955) § 6190; 29 Wis. Stat. Ann. 
§ 256.66." 
9 For fiscal 1971 $400,000 \l'fiS appropri:ttccl to fund the program. 
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sel as explicated in Gideon v. Wainwright, supra." 322 
F. Supp., at -. In Gideon, counsel had been denied 
an indigent defendant charged with a felony because 
his \vas not a capital case. This Court often has voided 
state statutes and practices which denied to accused 
indigents the means to present effective defenses in 
courts of law. Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353 
(1963); Draper v. Washington, 372 U. S. 487 (Hl63); 
Lane v. Brown, 372 U. S. 477 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 
351 U.S. 12 (1956). Here, however, Kansas has enacted 
laws both to provide and compensate from public funds 
counsel for the indigent.10 There is certainly no denial 
of the right to counsel in the strictest sense. Whether 
the statutory obligations for repayment impermissibly 
deter the exercise of this right is a question we need 
not reach, for we find the statute before us constitu-
tionally illfirm on other grounds. 
II 
The State has asserted in argument before this Court 
that the statute "has attempted to treat them [indigent 
defendants] the same as would any civil judgment debtor 
be treated in the State courts, ... " 11 Again, in its 
brief the State asserts that "for all practical purposes 
the methods available for enforcement of the judgment 
are the same as those provided by the Code of Civil 
Procedure or any other civil judgment." 1 " The chal-
lenged portion of the statute thrice alludes to means of 
debt recovery prescribed by the Kansas Code of Civil 
Procedure.l 3 
1o See n. 2, supra. 
n Transcript of Oral Arp;ummt, p. 9. The State concedes that 
exemptions for othrr ri1·il judgment drbtors are broader than for 
indigent defendant~ , a matter we will addrrs~ forthwith. !d., p. 10. 
1 " Brief of Apprllant, p. 7. 
1 3 See Kan. Stat. Ann. 1071 Supp. 60-701 to 60-724, 60-2401 to. 
60-2419. 
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Yet the ostensibly equal treatment of indigent de-
fendants with other civil judgment debtors recedes 
sharply as one examines the statute more closely. The 
statute stipulates that save for the homestead, "none 
of the exemptions provided for in the code of civil pro-
cedure shall apply to any such judgment .... " 14 This 
provision strips from indigent defendants the array of 
protective exemptions Kansas has erected for other civil 
judgment debtors, including restrictions 011 the amount 
of disposable earniugs subject to garnishment, protec-
tion of the <.lebtor from wage garnishment at times of 
severe personal or family sickness, and exemption from 
attachment and execution on a debtor's personal cloth-
ing, books and tools of trade. For the head of a family, 
the exemptions afforded other judgment debtors become 
more extensive, and cover furnishings, food, fuel and 
clothing, means of transportation, pension funds, and 
even a family burial plot or crypt.15 
Of the above exemptions, none is more important 
to a debtor than the exemption of his wages from un-
restricted garnishment. The debtor's wages are his sus-
tenance, with which he supports himself and his family. 
The average low income wage earner spends nearly 
nine-tenths of those wages for items of immediate con-
sumption.'c This Court has recognized the potential of 
certain garnishment proceedings to "impose tremendous 
ha-rdships on wage earners with families to support." 
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U. R. 337, 340 
(1969).17 Kansas has likewise perceived the burden to 
14 The exemptions in the civil eode are set forth in Knn. Stat. Ann. 
1971 Supp. 60-2301 to 60-2311. 
15 Kan. Stat. Ann. 1971 Supp. 60-2304 and 60-2308. 
IG Bureau of Labor Statistics, Handbook of Labor Statistics 281 
(1968). Low-wage earners arc defined as families with after-tax 
income of less than $5,000. 
17 The Court in Sniadach held that Wisconsin's prejudgment wage 
garnishment procedure, as a taking of property without notice 
• 
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a debtor and his family when wages may be subj('ct 
to wholesale garnishment. Consequently, under its 
code of civil procedure, the maximum which can be 
garnisheed is the lesser of 25o/o of a debtor's weekly 
disposable earnings or the amount by which those earn-
ings exceed 30 times the federal minimum hourly wage. 
No one creditor may issue more than one garnishment 
during any one month, and no employer may discharge· 
an employee because his earnings have been garnisheed 
for a single indebtedness.18 For Kansas to deny pro-
tections such as these to the once criminally accused 
is to risk denying him the means needed to keep him-
self and his family afloat. 
The indigent's predicament under this statute comes 
into sharper focus when compared with that of one who 
has hired counsel in his defense. Should the latter 
prove unable to pay and a judgment be obtained against 
him, his obligation would become enforceable under the 
relevant provisions of the Kansas Code of Civil Proce-
dure. But, unlike the indigent under the recoupment 
statute, the code's exemptions would protect this judg-
m.ent debtor. 
It may be argued that an indigent accused, for whom 
the State has provided counsel, is in a different class 
with respect to collection of his indebtedness than a 
and prior hearing, violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
18 Kan. Stat. Ann. 1971 Supp. 60-2310 (b) and 60-2311. Sec-
tion 60-2310 also provide8 further debtor protection from wage 
11;arnishment at a time of climbling personal sickness and from pro-
fessional collecting agencies. See Kan. Stat. Ann. 1971 Supp. 60-
2310 (c) and (d). See alr:·o Bennrtt, The 1970 Knnsas Legislature 
in Review, 39 J. B. A. K. 107, 178 (1970), which points out that 
the State's restrictions on garniRhmcnts hnve been made to conform 
to Tit. III of the federnl Consumer Credit Protection Act, 82 Stat. 
163. Kansas, however, provided significant wage exemptions from 
garnishment long before the federal act was passed . 
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judgment creditor whose obligation arose from a private 
transaction. But other Kansas statutes providing for 
recoupment of public assistance to indigents do not in-
clude the severe provisions imposed on indigent defend-
·ants in this case. Kansas has enacted, as have many 
other States, la\YS for state recovery of public "·elfare 
assistance when paid to an ineligible recipient.' n Yet 
the Kansas welfare recipient, unlike the indigent drfclld-
ant, is not denied the customary exemptions."0 
19 1\an. Stnt. Ann. 1971 Rupp. 39-719b; 59-2006. Sect ion 39-
719b deals mainly with the: recover~· of assistanrr from an ineligible 
recipient. Yet ew•n whr n the " ·elf:ur rrcipirnt is dermed to have 
defrauded thf' State. hr sti ll f'Sea]W~ the immedia te interrst accumu-
lations and drninl of exrmptions imposed on indigent drfendant s: 
"39-719b. Dut.\· of rrcipirnt to report changes; act ion by board; 
rt'eovery of assistance obtainrd b~· inrligible recipi ent. If at any 
time during the continu[tiH'C of a~~islnnee to any person , thr recipirnt 
thrreof becomes posscssrd ol' any property or inromr in excess of 
the amount .'lscert.'lined [ tt the time of gmnt ing n~~i~t.'lnce, it shall 
be the duly of the reripient to notif~ · the count~· board o'f social 
welfare imrMdiately of thr recrip t or possr!<~ion of snrh property 
or income and sa id count~· board m:-t~·, after im·e~t igat ion , r:mrcl the 
assislnnre in .'l cronhl nrc Y>it h 1 hr circmm;l:111ces. 
"Any as~istance paid 8hall br rero,·rrable by the count~· hoard as 
a drbt due to the st.'lte and the count~· in proportion to thr amount 
of thr n~sis t a nce paid by l'il<"h, rrspccti,·rly: If during the life or on 
the drat h of any person recri,·ing .'l~~i~tnncr, it is found th:1l the 
recipient wa~ posse:oJKecl of inromr or proprrt~· in excess of the amount 
report ed or ascrrtnined at thr timr of grnnting; a~f'i~tance, and if it 
be Rhown that i'uch assistanrr w:t s oblninrd b~· an ineligible rreipient , 
the total amount of thr a~s istnnrr ma~· hr recoYcrrd b~· thr slate 
departmrnt of social wrlf11rP as a fomth rla~s rl:1im from the estate 
of thr recipient or in an act ion brought against thr rrcipirnt while 
living. rL. 1953, c. 22.f, ~ 2: Junr 30.]" 
20 There appear~ to br tl furthrr di:oJcrimin:dion ag:1inst thr indi-
gent defendant ns contrnsted with the drlinqurnt welfare rrci pient. 
The recoupment ~lalutr applicablr to indigent del'rnd:mls pro,·idcs 
for the accumulntion of G% annu:tl interrRt from the dntr cxpencli-
turrs arc made for rotm:=:f'! or other legnl defense costs. I<:an . Stat. 
Ann. 1971 Supp. 22-451:3. The inleresl build-up for the indigent, 
71-11-0PINION 
JAMES v. STRANGE 11 
We recognize, of course, that the State's claim to 
reimburr-e may take precedence, under appropriate cir-
cumstances, over the claims of private creditors and that 
enforcement procedures with respect to judgments need 
not be idcntical.21 This docs not mean, however, that 
a State may impose unduly harsh or discriminatory 
terms merely because the obligation is to the public 
treasury rather than to a. private creditor. The State 
itself in the statute before us analogir.es the judgment 
lien against the indigent defendant to other "judg-
ments under the code of civil procedure." But the 
statute then strips the indigent defendant of the very 
exemptions designed primarily to benefit debtors of low 
and marginal incomes. 
The Kansas statute provides for recoupment whether 
the indigent defendant is acquitted or found guilty. If 
defendant would not be insuhst:mtinl. In the five years before the 
judgment became dormant. intNcst accumulations could lift np-
pellt>e's $500 debt to almost $670. If the dormnnt judgment is 
reviwd within the statutoril~· prescribed two years, the principal 
and interest mi!!:ht total onr $750. (The intere~t presumably would 
run while the judgmrnt wa. dormant since "a dorm:mt judgment 
mny be rrvi1·ed and hn,·e the smne forcr and effort as if it had not 
become dormant .... " Kan. Stat. Ann. 1971 Supp. 60-2404.) 
Kansas also has a statute providing that all judgments shall bear 
8% interest from the dav on which thr~· are rendered. Kan. Stat. 
Ann. 1971 Supp. Hl-204 (recently amended from 6%). Presumably 
this statute would ('OI·er the "debts" of welfare recipients onre they 
are reduced 1 o jndgmrnt. The debt of the indigent defendant, how-
ever, runs from the dale 1 hr a~si~Umec is granted, while any interest 
on the debt of a welfare recipient would presumbly run from the 
date of judgment. 
~1 For example, Kansas dors not extend its exrmpl ions with resprct 
to wagr g[lrnishment to nny drbt due for [lny state or federal tax, 
Knn. Stat. Ann. 1971 Snpp. 60-2;HO (e) (:n. This type of public 
debt, howel'er, diffrrs from the instant ra~e in representing a wrong-
ful withholding from the State of a tax on assets in the actual 
posse~~ion of the tnxpny:•r and not, as here, a debt contracted under 
circumstances of indigency. 
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acquitted, the indigent finds himself obligated to repay 
the State for a service the need for which resulted from 
the State's prosecution. It is difficult to sec \Yhy such 
a defendant, adjudged to be innocent of the State's 
charge, should be denied basic exemptions accorded all 
other judgment debtors. The iudigent defendant who 
is found guilty is uniquely disadvanted in terms of the 
practical operation of the statute. A criminal convic-
tion usually limits employment opportunities. This is 
especially true where a prison sentence has been served. 
It is in the interest of society and the State that such 
a defendant, upon satisfaction of the criminal penal-
ties imposed, be afforded a reasonable opportunity of 
employment, rehabilitation and return to useful citizen-
ship. There is limited incentive to seek legitimate em-
ployment when, after serving a sentence during which 
interest has accumulated on the indebtedness for legal 
services, the indigent knows that his wages will be gar-
nisheed without the benefit of any of the customary 
exemptions. 
Appellee in this case has now married, works for a 
knodest wage, and has recently become a father. To 
deprive him of all protection of his wages and intimate 
personalty discourages the search for self-sufficiency 
which might make of the criminally accused a contrib-
uting citizen. Not only does this treatment not accord 
'vYith the treatment of indigent recipients of public wel-
fare or with that of other civil judgment debtors,"" but 
the Kansas statute also appears to be alone among re-
coupment laws applicable to indigent defendants in 
22 The statutes of various other State·, e. g., Alaska, South Caro-
lina, a.nd West Virginia, proYide, as does Kansas, for recovery against 
indigent defendants in the snmc manner as on other judgments. 
Unlike Kansas, however, thrse States do not expressly subject indi-
gents to conditions to which other civil judgment debtors are not 
liable. See n. 8, supra, for citations. 
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expressly denying them the benefit of basic debtor 
exemptions.~3 
III 
In Rinaldi v. r aeger, 384 U. S. 305 ( 1966), the Court 
considered a situation comparable in some respects to 
the case at hand. Rinaldi involved a New Jersey statute 
which required only those indigent defendants who were 
sentenced to confinement in state institutions to reim-
burse the State the costs of a transcript on appeal. In 
Rinaldi, as here, a broad ground of decision was urged, 
namely, that the statute unduly burdened an indigent's 
right to appeal. The Court found, however, a different 
basis for decision, holding that "to fasten a financial 
burden only upon those unsuccessful appellants who are 
confined in state institutions ... is to make an invidious 
discrimination" in violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause. Id., at 309. 
Rinaldi affirmed that the Equal Protection Clause "im-
poses a requirement of some rationality in the nature of 
the class singled out." I d., at 308-309. This require-
ment is lacking where, as in the instant case, the State· 
has subjected indigent defendants to such discriminatory 
conditions of repayment. This case, to be sure, differs 
from Rinaldi in that here all indigent defendants are 
treated alike. But to impose these harsh conditions on 
a class of debtors who were provided counsel as required 
by the Constitution is to practice, no less than in Rinaldi, 
a discrimination which the Equal Protection Clause· 
proscribes. 
The Court assumed in Rinaldi, arguendo "that a leg-
islature could validly provide for replenishing a county 
treasury from the pockets of those who have directly 
benefitted from county expenditures." Id., at 309. We· 
note here also that the state interests represented by 
28 See n. 8, supra, for citations. 
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recoupment laws may prove important ones. Recoup-
ment proceedings may protect the State from fraudu-
lent concealment of assets and false assertions of 
indigeney. Many States, moreover, face expanding 
criminal dockets, and this Court has required appointed 
counsel for indigents in widening classes of cases 2 .1 and 
stages of prosecution.25 Such trends have heightened 
the burden on public revenues, and recoupment laws 
reflect legislative efforts to recover some of the added 
costs. Finally, federal dominance of the Nation's major 
revenue sources has encouraged State and local govern-
ments to seek new methods of conserving public funds, 
not only through the recoupment of indigents' counsel 
fees but of other forms of public assistance as we1l. 
We thus recognize that state recoupment statutes may 
betoken legitimate state interests. But these interests 
are not thwarted by requiring more even treatment of 
indigent criminal defendants with other classes of debtors 
to whom the statute itself repeatedly makes reference. 
State recoupment laws, notwithstanding the state in-
terests they may serve, need not blight in such dis-
criminatory fashion the hopes of indigents for self 
sufficiency and self respect. The statute before us em-
bodies elements of punitiveness and discrimination which 
violate the rights of citizens to equal treatment uuder 
the law. 
The judgment of the court below is affirmed. 
24 Gideon v. Wainwright, supra; Douglas v. California, supra; 
Argersinger v. Hamlin,- U.S.- (1972). 
25 Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970); Mempa v. Rhay, 389' 
U. S. 128 (1967); United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218 (1967); 
Miranda v. An"zona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966). 
Julyll7, 1972 
Re: No. 71-11 James v. Strange 
Dear Mr. Putzel: 
Thank you so much for your thorough and thoughtful 
editorial suggestions. All are agreeable to me, but I do 
not believe we need the "for" on page 13. 
Reference to the Oregon and North Dakota statutes 
on pages 5 and 6 of the text should be deleted. My revised 
text should now read: 
''In Virginia and West Virginia, the amount 
paid to court-appointed counsel is assessed 
only against convicted defendants as a pBrt 
of costs, although the majority of state 
recoupment laws apply whether or not the 
defendant prevails. It is thus apparent that 
state recoupment laws and procedures . . • '' 
Your revised footnote 8 is thus appropriate. 
Again, many thanks. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Henry Putzel, jr. 
